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L A B 0 R L A W
Can a Public Employer
Require Employees
to Use Their Comp Time?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 236-238. © 2000 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisc.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. He is the
co-author of West's Alternative
Dispute Resolution.
Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
The Court is asked to decide
whether a public agency governed
by the compensatory time provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(o),
may, absent a preexisting agree-
ment, require its employees to use
accrued compensatory time.
FACTS
The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,
requires employers to pay nonex-
empt employees time and one-half
their hourly wage for work consid-
ered "overtime" under the Act. 28
U.S.C. § 207(o)(1) permits public
employers to avoid paying cash
overtime wages by paying compen-
satory time to such employees
instead.
It is a policy of Harris County,
Texas, that the accrued compen-
satory time off for employees in its
Sheriff's Department who are cov-
ered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act must be kept below a predeter-
mined level. The bureau comman-
ders set these levels based on each
bureau's personnel requirements.
The County asks employees reach-
ing the maximum allowable hours of
compensatory time authorized by
the FLSA to take steps to reduce the
number of accrued hours. A super-
visor may order an employee to
reduce accumulated compensatory
time at a time suitable to the
bureau. An employee dissatisfied
with the supervisor's order may
informally complain to higher levels
of supervisor authority within the
department.
The employees in this case filed a
class action against the County in
federal district court. The district
court entered summary judgment
against the County. 945 F.Supp.
1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The district
court held that accumulated com-
pensatory time and salary must be
treated the same way and that
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employees have a right to use com-
pensatory time when they choose.
According to the court, the County
in this case involuntarily shortened
an employee's workweek with pay in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5).
The County appealed the district
court's summary judgment to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, arguing that its policy was
authorized by 1985 amendments to
the FLSA. The court of appeals
reversed the district court, holding
that the 1985 amendments to the
FLSA do not grant public employees
a right to choose when they will use
accrued compensatory time.
Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d
241 (5th Cir. 1998). The United
States Supreme Court granted the
employees' petition for certiorari.
CASE ANALYSIS
In 1985, the FLSA was amended to
allow public employers to agree with
employees or their representatives
to award compensatory time in lieu
of monetary payments at a rate not
lower than one and one-half hours'
pay for every overtime hour the
employee works. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o).
(With respect to employees not cov-
ered by a bargaining or representa-
tive's agreement, but hired before
April 15, 1986, the regular practice
in effect on that date constitutes an
agreement satisfying the statute.)
Employees working overtime would
receive additional time off from the
job with pay, but not cash at the
higher overtime rates.
Section 207(o)(5) provides that an
employee of a political subdivision
of a state who has accrued compen-
satory time and who has requested
the use of such compensatory time
"shall be permitted by the employ-
ee's employer to use such time with-
in a reasonable period after making
the request if the use of the com-
pensatory time does not unduly dis-
rupt the operation of the public
agency.''
Section 207(o)(5) does not express-
ly address the issues raised by the
County's policy. That section is trig-
gered only when the employee first
requests the use of his or her
accrued compensatory time, and it
does not address whether a public
employer may control an employ-
ee's accrual of compensatory time.
The employees contend that the use
of accrued compensatory time may
not be compelled absent a freely
arrived-at bilateral agreement
between the employer and the
employee. The employees assert
that Congress vested the employee,
rather than the employer, with
the right to determine the use
of accrued compensatory time
off. They urge that 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(o)(5) imposed only one
limitation on this right-that the
use of the compensatory time must
not unduly disrupt the operations of
the public agency.
According to the employees, a
mandatory time-off system is incon-
sistent with the FLSA overtime
standard. They reason that the use
of employer-mandated time off as
overtime compensation in lieu of
cash alleviates the market incentive
to shorten the workweek to the
national standard and to spread the
work among employees.
Since no other limitation on this
right was imposed by Congress, the
employees assert that they can
choose whether to use or to bank
their compensatory time as they see
fit. According to the employees,
employers do not have the right to
control employees' use of their
accrued compensatory time so long
as their use does not unduly disrupt
agency operations.
They also claim that the regulations
of the Department of Labor, the
agency that administers and
enforces the FLSA, do not allow an
employer to require an employee to
use accrued compensatory time off
involuntarily in the absence of a
lawful agreement providing such
authorization. They assert that
these regulations are reasonable and
in harmony with the language of the
FLSA.
The County, however, contends that
the 1985 amendments to the FLSA
were enacted to alleviate the eco-
nomic burden upon state and local
governments imposed by the Act's
cash overtime requirements. It
urges that Congress must have
intended for public employers to
control the accrual of compensatory
time because Congress contemplat-
ed circumstances in which a public
employer may elect to reduce or
eliminate accrued compensatory
time by making cash payments.
The County points to 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(o)(3)(B), which states that "if
compensation is paid to an employ-
ee for accrued compensatory time
off, such compensation shall be paid
at the regular rate earned by the
employee at the time the employee
receives such payment." Since this
section permits a public employer
to reduce accrued compensatory
time cash payments, the County
asserts that reductions in compen-
satory time must be at the employ-
er's option.
SIGNIFICANCE
As originally enacted in 1938, the
FLSA applied only to private
employers. Beginning in 1966, how-
ever, Congress expanded the cover-
age to protect state and local gov-
ernment employees. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(holding that the Constitution per-
(Continued on Page 238)
American Bar Association
mitted the FLSA to be applied
to states and their political
subdivisions).
In 1985, the FLSA was amended to
permit public employers, under
specified circumstances, to provide
compensatory time rather than cash
wages to employees who worked
overtime. Under the FLSA, the com-
pensatory time received by those
public employees who work over-
time may be preserved, used, or
cashed out consistent with the pro-
visions of Section 207(o)(5). The
employer may discharge its obliga-
tion by paying for the compensatory
time at the regular rate earned by
the employee at the time the
employee receives payment. Upon
termination of employment, the
employer must pay the employee
for unused compensatory time at a
rate of compensation not less than
the average regular rate received by
such employee during the last three
years of the employee's employ-
ment, or the final regular rate
received by the employee, whichev-
er is higher.
The economic consequences of this
case are clear. With tight budgets,
public employers like the county
wish to control the accrual of com-
pensatory time in order to avoid
paying cash overtime wages. On the
other hand, the public employees
want to accumulate accrued comp
time up to the statutory maximum
in order to begin receiving pay-
ments at an overtime rate of time
and one-half, or at least retain
the ability to "bank" their compen-
satory time for later use at their
discretion.
In Heaton v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1176,
1181 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied
sub nom Schiro v. Heaton, 515 U.S.
1104 (1995), the Eighth Circuit
held that an employer could not
require employees to use compen-
satory time before using their annu-
al leave. The Eighth Circuit
explained that when "a statute lim-
its a thing to be done in a particular
mode, it includes a negative of
another mode." 43 F.3d at 1180.
The Fifth Circuit has disagreed with
this decision, finding that nothing in
the FLSA limits an employer's
power to require an employee to use
accrued compensatory time. See
also Alford v. Louisiana, 145 F.3d
280 (5th Cir. 1998), holding that an
employer could require employees
to use compensatory time before
using annual leave.
This case gives the Supreme Court
the opportunity to resolve the dis-
agreement between the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits. Of course, the final
answer, however, may be provided
by further congressional action.
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